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Licensing Restrictions and 
Appropriating Market Benefits from 
Plant Innovation 
Jay P. Kesan∗
Recent patent cases have come under fire with producers 
accused of seeking to maximize profits by undermining 
consumers’ rights of sale.1  Yet in the case of agricultural 
biotechnology, its reliance on patent law is more complex because 
of the unique reproductive qualities of its products.  Some products 
require a great deal of technical innovation, but once acquired, they 
can be reproduced perfectly and then used or sold by the consumer 
without additional cost.  At the same time, certain licensing 
agreements now prohibit farmers from carrying out long-standing 
practices on their farms.  These issues have come to the forefront 
of patent law, because of cases brought forth by agbiotech firm 
Monsanto.2  This talk addresses intellectual property concerns 
posed by licensing restrictions associated with the sale of seed and 
the problem of appropriating market benefits from plant 
innovation.  Among some 1,200 cases that Monsanto has filed 
against infringers of its patent claims, only two have progressed 
significantly to the Federal Circuit: Monsanto v. McFarling3 has 
been heard in district court and Federal Circuit opinions, and 
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Georgetown University School of Law.  This article is an edited transcript of the author’s 
remarks made at the Fordham Intellectual Property Symposium on November 18, 2005. 
John Richards et al., Panel I: Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Scope of Downstream Licensing 
Restrictions, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1025 (2006). 
 1 See, e.g., John Richards et al., Panel I: Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Scope of Downstream 
Licensing Restrictions, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1025 (2006). 
 2 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 117 Fed. Appx. 729 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto 
Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 3 363 F.3d 1336. 
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Monsanto v. Scruggs4 is still in litigation.  In the case of 
McFarling, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld 
Monsanto’s licensing agreements against Homan McFarling, a 
Mississippi farmer.5
Monsanto is an agricultural firm involved in seed production 
and agricultural biotechnology, including the production of 
genetically modified seeds.  Seed producers, like Monsanto, have 
different contractual relationships with different types of farmers: 
those who use the seed for food and feed and those who plant it.  
For farmers who are seed producers, they enter straight-up, output 
contracts, in which Monsanto purchases all the output the farmers 
produce.  They typically do not involve any patent issues.  For 
farmers who use the seed primarily for food and feed, they are held 
by express license restrictions on seed bags, often referred to as a 
“bag-tag license” or a “seed-wrap license.” 
Monsanto has brought cases against farmers it believes have 
violated its bag-tag licenses.6  These licenses cover a bag of 
genetically modified seed that is insect-resistant, herbicide-
resistant, or salinity-resistant.  The particular gene in the seed that 
is susceptible to these factors has been modified.  This genetically 
modified seed is then sold in a bag with a label, specifying that this 
seed can be used to produce food and feed, but cannot be used to 
grow more seed for planting.  Farmers can plant the seed, but after 
harvest they must sell the leftover seed as food or feed; they cannot 
replant it. 
Even with the bag-tag license, genetically modified seed is 
enormously popular: seventy percent of the soybean grown in the 
United States is genetically modified.7  Take, for instance, the 
specific example of Roundup Ready seeds from the Monsanto 
cases.8  These seeds have been genetically modified to resist a 
particular type of herbicide.  If a farmer plants these seeds in the 
 4 117 Fed. Appx. 729. 
 5 McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1338. 
 6 See, e.g., Scruggs, 117 Fed. Appx. 729; McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1340. 
 7 Genetically Modified Crops in the United States, Pew Initiative on Food and 
Biotechnology, Aug. 2004, http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/factsheets/display.php3? 
FactsheetID=2 (last visited July 22, 2006). 
 8 Scruggs, 117 Fed. Appx. 729; McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336. 
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ground and sprays the farm with herbicides, then the herbicides kill 
all the weeds, but not the seeds.  The seeds remain unaffected by 
the herbicides, because geneticists have located and inhibited the 
particular enzyme (EPSPS enzyme) in the seed that is susceptible 
to it.  Roundup Ready seeds and the herbicide effectively rid the 
farm of weeds.  Farmers benefit because yields increase.  Studies 
have been done that show the many benefits of using Roundup 
Ready seeds.  Therefore, it is not surprising that farmers behave 
rationally and want to buy these seeds. 
Despite all these benefits, a problem emerges on the producer 
side.  These Roundup Ready soybeans are self-pollinating; they 
breed true and, therefore, replicate perfectly.  If a farmer buys a 
bag of soybean, then he can continue planting the soybean and 
producing perfect samples, almost digital copies, of the genetically 
modified seed simply by planting it.  He is limited only by his 
ability to keep the seed clean and dry during the off-season; in 
other words, his ability to store it properly.  Hybrid crops, on the 
other hand, act differently.  If a farmer buys a bag of a genetically 
modified hybrid seed, such as corn, he might be able to use it a 
second time with some loss, but the third or fourth time, the crop 
yield will drop significantly.  Hybrid seeds are not self-pollinating; 
they have built-in protection for the producer.  Therefore, when 
producers sell self-pollinating seeds like soybeans, they will have 
to act to minimize replanting in order to achieve the same levels of 
protection that is built into hybrid seeds.  It follows that producers 
will price the self-pollinating seed differently taking into account a 
certain number of replanting activities. 
In the case of genetically modified seed, such price 
mechanisms accounting for “brown-bagging” may well result in 
pricing the seed too high for farmers.  Monsanto, therefore, relies 
on the bag-tag licensing restrictions.  Nonetheless, consumers are 
selling saved seed among themselves in direct infringement of the 
licenses.  There are roughly 85 million acres of corn and soybean 
in the United States, and they are roughly equal to each other.  
Taking into account the differences between the amount of seed 
that is used in corn and soybean, the amount of soybean sold is 
considerably lower—many times lower—than corn.  We have to 
assume that a significant amount of so-called “brown-bagging” 
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takes place to explain the difference.  By the way, “brown-
bagging” refers to farmers selling saved-seed because they sell it in 
plain, brown bags. 
Does Monsanto have a right to prevent brown-bagging?  
Turning to the precedents, we find that the Federal Circuit decided 
in the 1992 case of Mallinckrodt that if a patentee goes beyond the 
physical or temporal scope of the patent grant, then that is 
impermissible.9  Later in the 1997 case, Braun v. Abbott Labs, the 
Federal Circuit provided a few examples of impermissible 
restrictions, such as using a patented product to try to control an 
un-patented product and going beyond the term of the grant.10  In 
the case of genetically modified seed, we have to look at the 
restriction itself and decide whether it is within or outside the 
patent grant.11  Looking at the patent grant complies with some old 
Supreme Court cases, like the 1938 case of General Talking 
Pictures.12
Patent rights only apply to that which is described and claimed 
in the patent.13  Once we determine the limits of the statutory 
patent grant, then we can determine infringement, because the 
crucial point is that farmers cannot practice the patent claims.  That 
means farmers cannot make, use, sell, or offer to sell a patented 
invention without a license.  They may buy an article that is 
patented.  If they buy an article with no restrictions whatsoever 
(i.e., an unconditional sale), then they have paid for it and they 
have an “implied” license stating that they have obtained the 
purchased good free and clear of any restrictions.14  However, if 
they buy an article that is governed by a “bag-tag” or “seed-wrap” 
license, then the producer’s licensed right is exhausted, but other 
rights are not. 
Consumers often have a choice to buy the product with or 
without a license.  For articles governed by a license, the producer 
 9 Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 10 B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 11 Id. 
 12 General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938). 
 13 See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2000). 
 14 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro II), 377 U.S. 476, 484 
(1964). 
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usually charges a lower amount; the consumer can pay a lower 
amount for an incomplete set of rights.  In the Lexmark case, the 
price for re-usable printer cartridges that were governed by a 
license requiring the consumer to refill it through Lexmark was 
around 20 percent lower than the price of a printer cartridge that 
was not governed by a license.15  If the consumer wants all the 
rights, then the consumer can have an unconditional sale and pay a 
higher price.  Whether or not this price discrimination makes 
economic sense, the producers are alienating a different set of 
property rights.  Therefore, they should be able to price 
differentially.  Differential pricing allows many more transactions 
to clear in the marketplace than is the case if only unconditional 
sales were allowed. 
What happens if we do not enforce licenses?  Then we force 
producers to charge higher prices, and then many transactions 
simply do not take place.  Mark Patterson cautions us that in 
regards to price discrimination, the welfare effects are 
ambiguous.16  The welfare effects of price discrimination become 
ambiguous only if we do not properly monitor or control for the 
baseline.  Consider the situation without price discrimination, 
when producers sell seed unconditionally at supra-competitive 
prices.  Taking that to be the baseline, allowing price 
discrimination across different markets and products permits us to 
reduce some deadweight losses leading to an increase in social 
welfare.  When the supra-competitive price is higher than the 
competitive price, those transactions between the competitive price 
and the supra-competitive price fail to clear.  For example, in an 
unconditional sale, if the competitive price in a market for pencils 
is two dollars and the patented price is five dollars, then 
transactions between two and five dollars do not take place.  In 
new markets with price discrimination, the product can be sold for 
a whole variety of prices corresponding to different uses; a number 
of new transactions can take place; a number of new markets are 
 15 Ariz. Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981, 983 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 16 John Richards et al., Panel I: Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Scope of Downstream 
Licensing Restrictions, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1025 (2006) 
(Mark Patterson, panelist). 
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created; and the welfare effects are positive when compared with 
the alternative. 
One may also ask, in the case of seeds, why not permit seed 
saving?  This is the “God-made-germplasm” argument.  The 
simple problem is that it is just not true.  The value chain in the 
modern food sector is enormously complicated.  It begins with 
start-up agbiotech companies performing a great deal of research 
and development in genetics.  University departments of 
agricultural-science and agricultural engineering have moved away 
from germplasm breeding toward work in genetics.  These start-up 
agbiotech companies and universities provide their technologies to 
large life-science companies and large agriculture-equipment 
companies.  By the time we arrive at a farmer, we are much farther 
along in the value chain.  He takes advantage of all the genetically 
modified technologies that the start-up agbiotech companies, 
universities, and large-life science companies have worked on, and 
the benefits that accrue to him do not derive from his labor, 
innovation, or investment alone.  In addition to genetically 
modified crops, the farmer uses new technologically advanced 
equipment, which further contributes to his higher yield.  For 
example, these large agriculture-equipment companies build 
combines that are fitted with global positioning system (GPS) 
equipment.  This equipment allows the farmer to plot crop yields—
the width of the combines times four feet: six-foot-by-four-foot 
plots that allow the farmer to gauge precisely what the crop yields 
are.  A complicated value chain continues downstream from the 
farmer: it goes to the grain elevator; from there, it goes to a food 
processor and so on; then it finally ends up with buyers/consumers. 
We need a system where parties in the value chain in the 
modern food sector can share in the risks and benefits of R&D; 
then they can coordinate their activities as the product goes 
through the value chain, rather than enabling a system where one 
player takes all the risk, and another receives all the benefits.  
Allowing the farmer to save seed goes back to a simple principle: 
he is trying to reap where he did not sow.  He is not the only 
person who has contributed to the enhanced yield.  There are a 
number of other players who have done their part and have a right 
to get paid and have a right to benefit.  We can argue about 
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whether the benefit to producers and others is commensurate with 
their innovation or not.  This is exactly where the debate should be.  
For instance, what is covered by the patent claim at issue and what 
is not covered by the patent claim? 
This rationale may be exclusive to agricultural biotechnology.  
The same protection extended to Monsanto may not apply to other 
companies, such as Lexmark.  In my opinion, the patent issues in 
the Lexmark case, involving the illegal reconstruction of printer 
cartridges, were not squarely presented.17  Certain questions arise: 
Is this cartridge patented?  What, exactly, is patented?  What is the 
scope of the claim?  But in the case of seeds, it is quite different: 
you have wholesale reproduction.  There is no question that there 
is perfect replication.  Distinguishing between legal repair and 
illegal reconstruction is less problematic when a consumer can re-
create the whole genetically modified seed perfectly.  Even in 
cases such as Aro I and Aro II, the U.S. Supreme Court continues 
to uphold that full-scale reconstruction is illegal.18
Licensing restrictions, likewise, may not work as well for other 
industries.  Different industries and technological sectors rely on 
the patent system to varying extents to appropriate benefits from 
their innovations.  Some industries use other means, other than 
licenses, to reap the benefits of their innovation.  Certain industries 
employ the first-mover advantage or they rely on network effects 
to appropriate benefits from their innovation.  Certain software 
products lock the consumer in, because the cost of changing to new 
software is too high.  They may also appropriate benefits through 
other means, such as reputational capital, bundling sales and 
services, and so forth.  These practices, however, do not work for 
seed companies.  In the case of genetically modified crops that are 
self-pollinating, it is as if you bought a CD containing some 
software, and the CDs were replicating at night!  The software 
industry, with their shrink-wrap licenses, would never allow that, 
and they have network effects and other practices to help them 
prevent customers from doing so.  The producers of genetically 
modified seeds have no such protection.  Hybrid crops, on the 
 17 Lexmark Int’l, 421 F.3d at 983. 
 18 See Aro II, 377 U.S. 476; Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro I), 
365 U.S. 336 (1961). 
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other hand, have built-in protection.  Therefore, when dealing with 
certain kinds of industries (such as agbiotech) and certain kinds of 
products (such as self-pollinating crops), producers are dependent 
on utility patent protection and enforcement to prevent free-riding 
and brown-bagging. 
Before I conclude, I want to discuss contractual issues and 
intermediaries involved in the Monsanto cases.19  Then, I will turn 
to the role of the legislature in solving these complications and 
solutions proposed in other parts of the world.  I have glossed over 
some contractual issues, in part, because seed producers are 
perfecting their notice requirements and contracts.  They have 
learned from not providing proper notice in the past.  Nevertheless, 
there are contractual issues, and conflicts have arisen over bag-tag 
licensing with intermediaries, like JEM Ag Supply, in the JEM v. 
Pioneer case.20  In JEM v. Pioneer, the litigation came about 
because there were thousands and thousands of Pioneer seed bags 
that were found in JEM Ag Supply, and every one of these bags 
has a unique number to it, and based on those numbers, they found 
that JEM Ag Supply had not paid for them.21  Therefore, the 
relationship between some of these retailers and agbiotech firms, 
like Monsanto and Pioneer, is strained. 
It is common in patent law for producers to sue intermediate 
players for contributory infringement and for actively inducing 
infringement—Sec. 271(b) and Sec. 271(c)—instead of going after 
the direct infringer, because the direct infringer is very often a 
customer.  The enforcement of licenses becomes problematic for 
producers, because it involves suing customers.  Most seed 
producers admit that they do not want to sue farmers.  They are 
their ultimate customers, and they have longstanding relationships 
with them.  Indeed, some of them, such as DuPont-Pioneer, as a 
matter of policy, refuse to do so.  They may sue seed companies, 
but they do not sue farmers.  However, Monsanto has gone after 
direct customers whereas DuPont-Pioneer has not.22  In short, there 
 19 Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 117 Fed. Appx. 729 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto Co. v. 
McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 20 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
 21 Id. at 124. 
 22 See, e.g., Scruggs, 117 Fed. Appx. 729; McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336. 
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are other non-patent issues such as customer relations and public 
relation concerns that become relevant. 
Before turning to solutions proposed in other parts of the 
world, let’s consider the role of Congress in determining the 
validity and limits of the intellectual property rights of genetically 
modified seeds.  Sexually reproduced plants are protected by this 
sui generis, legislatively created IP regime called the Plant Variety 
Protection Act (PVPA).23  The interface between PVPA and the 
Utility Patent Act24 has caused some confusion.  The PVPA 
protects only the plant as a whole and, unlike utility patents, allows 
exceptions, like the breeding exception and the saving-seed 
exception.  Utility patents protection, on the other hand, is more 
robust: it also covers individual components of the plant and the 
methods involved in plant innovation, like the actual 
transformation method and how the gene is introduced into the 
seed.  Compared to the Utility Patent Act, the PVPA provides a 
narrow scope of protection. 
Despite these differences between the PVPA and the Utility 
Patent Act, it has been urged, relying on a preemption argument, 
that Congress has acted in this area through the PVPA to provide 
IP protection, as in the argument made in J.E.M. v. Pioneer that 
went before the U.S. Supreme Court in 2001.25  J.E.M. claimed 
that plant protection had already been provided by the PVPA and, 
therefore, utility patents should not be granted for plant 
innovation—a preemption argument.26  Yet the argument did not 
succeed.27  Instead, the Supreme Court held that utility patent 
protection is also available for plant innovation.28  Perhaps 
Congress will have to revisit this issue to clearly establish what the 
PVPA covers and what it does not and how these two regimes 
work together.  At present, we find state legislatures becoming 
involved and seeking to pass legislation to regulate contractual 
practices between seed producers and farmers. 
 23 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2372 (2000). 
 24 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2000). 
 25 534 U.S. 124. 
 26 Id. at 125. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
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Other solutions have been proposed in the United Kingdom 
and South America that might provide some insight into how to 
reward innovators in R&D.29  Peter Carstensen made an interesting 
suggestion about applying the U.K. PVPA in the U.S.30  He 
explained how the U.K. regime allows farmers to save seed by 
charging them a fee through the seed cleaner.31  Most farmers 
would like the U.K. regime; however, the U.K. saving-seed regime 
only applies to small farmers, i.e., farmers who own less than a 
fixed acreage, say less than 150 acres.32  For example, if a farmer 
owns more than 150 acres, then he has to pay the seed producer; he 
cannot unconditionally save seed.  Therefore, all the big farmers 
have to pay and the small farmers do not.  Looking at the suits 
Monsanto has brought against farmers, we find that Mr. Homan 
McFarling was farming 8,000 acres,33 and Mr. Scruggs was 
farming several thousand as well.34  McFarling was saving 1,500 
bushels of soybean—not a small amount.35  Even under the U.K. 
regime, Montano could sue both of these farmers.36  The PVPA,37 
which is based out of the international UPOV convention,38 has 
certain compulsory exceptions and certain optional exceptions; 
hence these differences between countries emerge.  Each country 
can tailor the UPOV legal regime according to its needs by 
choosing or opting out of the optional requirements.39
Other countries are experimenting with having other people in 
the value chain pay the seed producers, other than the farmer.  
Argentina, for example, is the mirror image of the United States in 
the Southern Hemisphere, where northern Argentina looks like the 
southern United States.  The crops that grow in northern Argentina 
 29 See, e.g., Plant Varieties Protection Act, 1997, Ch. 66, § 10 (U.K.). 
 30 Richards, supra note 16 (Peter Carstensen, panelist).  See also Peter Carstensen, 
Post-Sale Restraints via Patent Licensing: A “Seedcentric” Perspective, 16 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1053 (2006). 
 31 Carstensen, supra note 30. 
 32 See Plant Varieties Protection Act 1997, Ch. 66, § 10. 
 33 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 34 Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 117 Fed. Appx. 729 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 35 McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1339. 
 36 See Plant Varieties Protection Act, 1997, Ch. 66, § 10 (U.K.). 
 37 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2372 (2000). 
 38 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 1961, Paris. 
 39 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 1961, Paris. 
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are the same as those grown in the southern United States.  
Argentina is the second and third producer of soybean and corn in 
the world, respectively.40  They were one of the few countries that 
embraced GM crops in the early 1990s.  To ensure that the large 
life-science companies are paid in this arena, they are 
experimenting with imposing taxes on farmers’ crops.41  We can 
argue about whether using taxes makes economic sense or not, but 
the purpose is not to impose the burden on the farmer and instead 
make others further down the value chain compensate the seed 
producers.  Brazil is experimenting with payments from elevator 
operators—that is, other people, besides the farmer, who benefit 
from the higher yields of seed.42  The purpose is, once again, to 
establish mechanisms so that innovators are rewarded by others 
who are in a better position perhaps to bear the burden. 
Whatever the outcome, a tremendous amount of activity is 
likely to be forthcoming in this area, perhaps in the legislatures, 
and definitely in the courts.  The key issue remains how do you 
create a system where you can promote innovation; where you can 
share in the risks and benefits of R&D; and, at the same time, try to 
create new markets and permit the ability to alienate these much 
sought after products throughout society? 
 
 40 Agribusiness, Argentine Republic Investment Promotion Agency, 
http://www.inversiones.gov.ar/sectors_invest.htm (last visited July 22, 2006). 
 41 U.S.-Latin Accord on GM crops a timely warning for Australia, THE GUARDIAN, 
Mar. 10, 2004, available at http://www.cpa.org.au/garchve04/1174gm.html (last visited 
July 22, 2006). 
 42 Rachel Melcer, Monsanto Sees Sales Rise 22%; Posts Loss of $97 Million, ST LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 8, 2004, available at http://www.mindfully.org/Industry/2004/ 
Monsanto-Loses-US$97M7jan04.htm (last visited July 22, 2006). 
